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Abstract
This commentary explores some of the issues raised by Gilbert et al. short communication, Morality and Markets 
in the NHS. The increasing role of market mechanisms and the changing types of healthcare providers together 
with the use of choice and competition to drive improvements in quality in the National Health Service (NHS), 
all have important ethical implications. In order for the NHS to continue providing the level of service quality 
that out performs many high-income countries, despite spending much less on healthcare, we need a re-think of 
creeping marketization and privatisation and a consolidation of the NHS as a publically owned resource run for 
the benefit of patients and the public, not commercial interests.
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The article by Gilbert et al. (1), considering the market-based reform of the National Health Service (NHS), is timely as the funding and organisation of the NHS was 
a key issue in the May 2015 general election in the United 
Kingdom (UK). What kind of health service the public want 
and what kind of organisations (private, social enterprises 
or existing NHS contractors) should provide care, are key 
questions that all the political parties have to address.
Gilbert et al. (1) give an overview of  the history of  the NHS 
and argue that, ‘The post-2000 era has been defined by a 
radical shift in the philosophy of healthcare policy-makers’. 
(p1) and this has resulted in a turn toward market ideology 
in health policy. The reasons they give for this ‘turn’ are 
changes in: the structure of the economy in the UK; attitudes 
of patients and an increase in patient autonomy; changing 
demographics, with an increasingly elderly population; and 
a rise in chronic conditions. It is hard to attribute causes 
to complex social phenomena, but I would argue that the 
commitment to a free market ideology that has characterised 
British governments since 1979 is one of the key drivers for 
change in the NHS. Hence, there has been continuity in 
healthcare policy from Thatcher’s first government in 1979, 
culminating in the 2012 Health and Social Care Act. The 
current changes in the NHS are the product of a gradual 
movement towards the privatisation and marketisation of 
the NHS.
The justifications for this creation of a more competitive 
market in healthcare have been set out in policy documents 
spanning 30 years and can be summarised as (2,3): a belief 
that the private sector is better managed; market forces will 
encourage leaner more efficient service provision and help 
contain costs; competition and patient choice will drive 
quality and innovation; and a decentralised health service 
will be more responsive to local needs and encourage citizen 
participation.
The culmination of these policies was the passage of the 
Health and Social Care Act in 2012. There are twin forces 
at play here: an increased use of market forces (defined as 
creating a competitive environment where services and 
labour are commodified) and privatisation (defined as 
ownership of public assets sold or transferred to the private 
sector) (4). The central aim of this legislation was to extend 
market forces into the NHS to a much greater degree than 
before. The Act changed how healthcare is commissioned 
(bought) by creating a national NHS Commissioning Board, 
now called NHS England. NHS England oversees clinical 
commissioning groups and these have responsibility for 
commissioning services for their local populations replacing 
Primary Care Trusts and Strategic Health Authorities. The 
aim of these consortiums is to give more local control and 
be more sensitive to market mechanisms. The Act has 
accelerated moves to encourage other organisations outside 
the NHS to bid for services previously offered by the NHS. 
The ‘any qualified provider’ initiative, (5) will enable patients 
to choose from a range of providers from different sectors: 
commercial, third sector and the NHS. The central aim of 
this diversification is to increase patient choice and stimulate 
competition between these different providers.
The 2012 Act also abolished the Secretary of State for Health’s 
duty to provide comprehensive health services throughout 
England and Wales, replacing it with a duty to exercise other 
functions to secure provision. This is an often misunderstood, 
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but key part, of the 2012 Act that will have profound 
implications for all aspects of the NHS. 
“The effect was to transform the English NHS from 
a nationally-mandated public service required of the 
government under primary legislation, into a service 
based on commercial contracting, underpinned by 
ministerial and local discretion and secondary legislation, 
and exacerbated by non-accountability to Parliament of 
commissioners and providers. Abolition of the duty of 
the Secretary of State to provide or secure provision of 
health services was the seminal change that brought this 
transformation about” (6).
As Hunter (7) notes, the Coalition government’s neo-
liberalism drives these health reforms, the aim is to roll back 
the state and increasingly rely on the use of private providers. 
Hinchingbrooke hospital in Cambridgeshire serves as an 
example of some of the problems with this approach. In 
November 2011 it was taken over by a private company Circle 
Health. Not long into the contract reports suggested that 
Circle was facing finance problems and had not been able to 
make the cost savings anticipated (8). Such companies have 
other obligations, to ensure that their services are translated 
into profits and this, arguably, can create a conflict of interest 
for such organisations that could threaten patient care. This 
concern was realised at Hinchingbrooke when it was rated as 
‘inadequate’ in 2014 by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
(who inspect health and social care to ensure appropriate 
stands) and the hospital was put on ‘special measures’: ‘The 
inspection highlighted serious concerns and CQC has told 
the trust it must improve’ (9). In January 2015 Circle Holdings 
announced that it would end the contract to run the hospital, 
citing problems with funding cuts and increased demand for 
accident and emergency services. While all these pressures 
are recognised, unlike publically owned hospitals, private 
companies have the option to walk away from these difficult 
situations [under the terms of the 10 year contract, it could be 
ended once they had invested a specific amount of money (£5 
million), a form of ‘get out’ clause (although reports suggest 
it has to date spent slightly less than this figure - £4.84m)] 
(10). When healthcare provision is owned and run by the 
NHS these fluctuations can be weathered and continuity in 
organisation and patient care maintained.
Gilbert et al. (1) give two solutions to the actual and future 
problems with an increase in the marketization of the NHS. 
First, they put forward a values-explicit approach that uses 
values as a means of regulating market forces, values that 
should be made explicit and consistent throughout the NHS 
(p3). Second, a systems-based approached should be utilised 
that looks holistically at the healthcare system, which will 
foster a collaborative rather than competitive environment 
(p4). In regard to the first suggestion it could be argued that 
this is already in operation with the NHS Constitution. 
Lord Darzi’s review of the NHS in 2008 recommended that 
the NHS should make explicit its values and commitments 
to patients and this should be enshrined in a constitution: 
‘establish[ing] the principles and values of the NHS in 
England. [The Constitution] sets out rights to which patients, 
public and staff are entitled, and pledges which the NHS is 
committed to achieve, together with responsibilities which 
the public, patients and staff owe to one another to ensure 
that the NHS operates fairly and effectively’ (11). The 
context for this is summed by this statement from the NHS 
Institute for Innovation and Improvement: ‘As our healthcare 
system becomes increasingly devolved, autonomous and 
entrepreneurial, there is a need for system-wide values, which 
reaffirm the social purpose of the NHS, to staff, patients 
and the public and inspire behaviours that put the needs of 
patients, staff and the public foremost in people’s minds’ (12). 
The Health Act 2009 stipulated that all bodies providing NHS 
services (NHS, private and third sector providers) must ‘have 
regard’ to the Constitution in all their actions and decisions. 
The NHS Constitution was recently updated in 2013 and it 
has been given a high prominence in all NHS documentation. 
This is part of a drive to make organisations and patients more 
aware of the Constitution so that it can have more influence 
on practice (13). 
Despite these moves it can be asked, how useful is the 
Constitution in practice? How is compliance with the 
Constitution to be policed? Who ensures that the increasingly 
diverse range of healthcare providers will adhere to these 
values? The Constitution includes pledges (non-legally 
binding ‘goals’) that independent organisations should 
have regard to, for example that all employees should have 
rewarding jobs. The 2012 Health Act includes a provision 
that Clinical Commissioning Groups must promote the 
Constitution and they will be held to account by the NHS 
England. However, in practice what does ‘have regard’ to the 
Constitution actually mean and what measures constitute 
promoting it? The Constitution can only be applied within 
the existing context and how much influence this can have on 
the basic structure of the NHS and how it can meaningfully 
ensure ethical practice is debatable.
Gilbert et al.’s (1) second suggestion is to embrace a systems 
theory approach to the NHS. One part of this is to encourage 
integration of services and provide more ‘joined up’ care. 
This is something that all healthcare systems struggle with 
and it is likely that an increasingly fragmented health service 
with different providers and types of organisation will 
decrease the likelihood of effective integration (14). Their 
suggestion that the Principles and Rules for Cooperation and 
Competition could, ‘strike a balance between the benefits of 
co-operation and competition.’ (p5) does not get to the heart 
of the problem to my mind. First, these regulations have 
been superseded by sections 75–7 of the Health and Social 
Care Act (15) and second, it is not clear what limits will 
be placed on competition as an end in itself. As the British 
Medical Association (BMA) note: ‘Despite Government 
assurances, many, including the BMA, felt the Regulations 
were unclear as to when commissioners would be able to 
legitimately restrict competition’ (16). This lack of clarity 
in the regulations and the government’s commitment to a 
competitively run health service mean that it will be hard to 
restrict competition even on grounds of ensuring cooperation 
and continuity of good quality care. This drive for free market 
competition, or what passes for this in a healthcare system, 
(17) will have detrimental effects for attempts to integrate 
services. The BMA again note: ‘It was also not clear from the 
regulations alone whether commissioners would be able to 
prioritise integration over competition and choice without 
leaving themselves open to challenge from Monitor…[And 
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this is] potentially damaging to the comprehensiveness and 
integration of services’ (18). Therefore, the legal regulatory 
framework of the 2012 Act needs to be re-thought before 
greater integration and co-operation can be realised.
The increasing role of the market in healthcare provision and 
the use of choice and competition to drive improvements 
in quality all have important ethical implications (19). The 
changes made by the 2012 Act were heavily criticised, the 
BMA for example said: ‘Since the Act received Royal Assent 
in 2012, we have maintained our opposition to increased 
competition and the development of the market in the NHS’ 
(18). There is a campaign for a NHS Reinstatement Bill (20) 
that wants to abolish competition, the provider-purchaser 
split, re-establish public bodies and accountability and restrict 
the role of commercial companies in the NHS. These kinds of 
reforms are a good place to start rethinking the last 30 years of 
health policy. In order for the NHS to continue to provide the 
level of service quality that out performs many high income 
countries, despite spending much less on healthcare (21), we 
need a re-think of creeping marketization and privatisation 
and aim to consolidate the NHS as a publically owned 
resource run for the benefit of patients and the public, not 
commercial interests. 
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